Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/Argumentos.24.9

Keywords:

Epistemic excuses. Innocence. Pragmatism. Attributions of knowledge.

Abstract

If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his place and acknowledge that they would not be aware of his ignorance. In this paper the application of such a principle will be defended, not only with regard to the attributions of knowledge in ordinary contexts, but also with regard to the most demanding contexts.

Author Biography

Rodrigo Laera, CONICET

Doutor em Filosofia. Pesquisador Conicet/Sadaf (Argentina)

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Published

2020-08-03

Issue

Section

Artigos