Brentano’s soul and the unity of consciousness

Authors

  • Guillaume Fréchette University of Salzburg

Keywords:

Philosophy of mind. Brentano. Soul. Consciousness.

Abstract

In the following paper, I discuss Fisette’s reconstruction of Brentano’s view, according to which Brentano’s conception of consciousness and of its unity is based on the presupposition that consciousness has a bearer, i.e. the soul. First, I identify Fisette’s real target (sect.1) and challenge his conception of the mental agent as central to Brentano’s account (sect. 2 and 3). In section 4, I formulate some doubts about the sources used by Fisette, and, in section 5, I propose another reading of the relation between the unity of consciousness and the mental agent in the late Brentano.

Downloads

Published

2015-01-01

Issue

No. 13

Section

Brentano and Philosophy of Mind

License

Argumentos magazine is licensed under an International Creative Commons Attribution License.

The Magazine uses CC BY inclusion

1) The authors retain the copyright granted to the magazine or the right to initial publication, with the work regularly licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution, which allows the sharing of the work with acknowledgment of authorship and initial publication in this magazine.

2) The authors are authorized to contract additional applicable contracts, for non-exclusive distribution of the version of the work published in this journal (for example, publication in the institutional repository or as a chapter of the book), recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal.

3) Authors are authorized and encourage to publish and distribute their work online (for example, in institutional repositories or on their personal pages) at any time before or during the editorial process, as they can generate productive changes, as well as increase the impact and reference of published work.