The evidence for relativism about future contingents
Keywords:
Future contingents. Indeterminism. Relativism. Supervaluationism.Abstract
John MacFarlane (2003; 2008; 2014, p. 201-237) claims that his relativist view on future contingents satisfies two desiderata: it is compatible with indeterminism and allows us to assess as accurate an assertion about a contingent event that has already occurred but that had not occurred when the assertion was made. Supervaluationism satisfies the first desideratum but not the second. I argue that MacFarlane does not provide good reasons to prefer his view to supervaluationism, and so for accepting his second desideratum. The only possible evidence that could be used to support his proposal consists in the apparent existence of accurate future contingent claims made in the past, and this evidence can be easily put into question. As a result, relativism is ill motivated in the case of future contingents.Downloads
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