Reconstructive impasses in the philosophy of science: causes and cases

Abstract

Theories developed by philosophers of science have the ambition, among others, to understand what gives cognitive status to scientific theories. They also seek to promote the conceptual elucidation or the rational reconstruction of the scientific activity. Another aim is that of clarifying key concepts tacitly or openly employed by scientists. Aiming at the achievement of goals like these, philosophers have produced works of great magnitude on science. However, the reconstructive dissonances that have been accumulating over time make it imperative to question whether the philosophy of science has been successful, and whether, after elaborating metasciences whose conflicts remain unsurpassed, it can still seek innovative ways of reconstructing science. The divergences that have been recalcitrant compel the philosophy with pretensions to be an actual philosophy of science to stop giving primacy to the sieves and criteria that lead it to make epistemological judgments about science that submit themselves only marginally to the reality of science. Only by making a critical assessment of its own reconstructive effectiveness can philosophy of science glimpse ways of overcoming the reconstructive impasses in which it has become entangled.