Confirmation of conditionals and Carnap’s reduction sentences

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/Argumentos.27.11

Palabras clave:

Carnap. Conditional. Confirmation. Predicate. Reduction sentence.

Resumen

Given that the material conditional can be true in three different situations, an empirical datum can confirm different conditionals. In fact, the same datum can confirm even conditionals that appear to be in contradiction with each other. By means of an example presented by Khemlani, Byrne, and Johnson-Laird, this issue is addressed below. To do that, the present paper resorts to the concept of reduction sentence offered by Carnap. The conclusions refer to the idea that, if this last concept is assumed, the problems of the confirmation of the conditional seem to disappear. This is, at least, as far as the example dealt with here is concerned.

Biografía del autor/a

Miguel López-Astorga, University of Talca

Professor and researcher at the Institute of Humanistic Studies "Juan Ignacio Molina", University of Talca

Citas

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BYRNE, R. M. J.; JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N. If and or: Real and counterfactual possibilities in their truth and probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, v. 46, n. 4, p. 760-780, 2020.

CARNAP, R. Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1947.

CARNAP, R. Testability and meaning. Philosophy of Science, v. 3, n. 4, 1936. p. 419-471.

CARNAP, R. Testability and meaning – Continued. Philosophy of Science, v. 4, n. 1, 1937. p. 1-40.

GOODWIN, G. P.; JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N. The truth of conditional assertions. Cognitive Science, n. 42, p. 2502-2533, 2018.

JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N.; RAGNI, M. Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning. Cognition, n. 193, 2019.

KHEMLANI, S.; BYRNE, R. M. J.; JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N. Facts and possibilities: A model-based theory of sentential reasoning. Cognitive Science, v. 42, n. 6, p.1887-1924, 2018.

LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, M. The semantic method of extension and intension and the four criteria of the conditional described by Sextus Empiricus. Revista de Filosofía, v. 44, n. 2, p. 253-261, 2019.

O’TOOLE, R. R.; JENNINGS, R. E. The Megarians and the Stoics. In: GABBAY, D. M.; WOODS, J. (Eds.). Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 1. Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 2004.

Publicado

2022-01-01

Número

Sección

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