Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle

Authors

  • Juliana Aggio

    DOI:

    https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i2.18925

    Keywords:

    Knowledge. Perception. Sensible object. Soul and body.

    Abstract

    This paper intends to clarify how perception knows the being according to Aristotle by treating a very controversial point: how perception discriminates its own objects and if this discrimination is strictly a physiological process or it is also an activity of the soul, and if it is also an activity of the soul, in which way the body’s physical alteration conjoined with a certain activity of the soul constitute perception.

    Author Biography

    • Juliana Aggio
      Doutoranda em Filosofia USP/Fapesp.

    Published

    2009-07-01

    Issue

    Section

    Artigos

    How to Cite

    Aggio, J. (2009). Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i2.18925