Is there an ontological debasement of sensitive knowledge in René Descartes' critique of the senses?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v7i14.19109Keywords:
Descartes. Platon. Théorie des Idées. Cogito. Métaphysique.Abstract
Descartes propose douter de tout pour établir quelque chose de stable et sûr dans les sciences. Cette critique se concentre sur une manière irréfléchie pour regarder la philosophie et la science, notamment en proposant que les sens ne sont pas le premier et privilégié objet de connaissance. Cela conduit à la conclusion que Descartes a abaissé le statut ontologique de la connaissance sensorielle? La portée de cet article est d’ examiner cette question, sur les opinions philosophiques de Platon et Descartes concernant le traitement de la connaissance sensible.
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