Moral responsibility and determinism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v8i16.19150Keywords:
Moral responsibility. Substantive responsibility. Guidance control. Compatibilism. Semi-compatibilist.Abstract
This article discusses the conditions, which must be met so that moral responsibility can be properly ascribed to the agent. I will argue that even accepting the truth of determinism it is plausible to think that agents are properly subjected to praise and blame. To argue in favor of this point I will consider cases of coercion and cerebral manipulation from the point of view of Thomas Scanlon’s compatibilist conception of responsibility and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s semi-compatibilist theory.
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