Non-existing objects: a pseudo problem?

Authors

  • Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho

    DOI:

    https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v9i17.19964

    Keywords:

    Nonexistent. Intentionality. Concepts. Ryle. Representation.

    Abstract

    How can we represent Santa Claus if Santa Claus does not exist? If representing something involves having a relation to what is represented, then how to establish a constitutive relation with a representation of something that does not exist? This is the famous problem of “intentional non-existence” in philosophy of mind. Here we argue that this is a pseudoproblem, a categorical error. To do so, based on Gilber Ryle’s The Concept of Mind, we show that this error arises when we include “non-existent” objects in the “immaterial” category, when in fact they belong to the category of “abstract objects.” After all, we have shown that if we could not bear a relationship with the “non-existent”, we, the human animals, might want to conceive such objects, but this is obviously a contradiction.

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    Published

    2017-07-31

    Issue

    Vol. 9 No. 17

    Section

    Varia

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    How to Cite

    Filho, M. F. R. (2017). Non-existing objects: a pseudo problem?. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 9(17). https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v9i17.19964