The elevation of ethical values in Lukács’ thought: from the in-itself to the for-itself

Abstract

Given the difficulty of reconciling individual and collective interests in a social context shaped by the predominance of individualism, social transformation appears almost impossible. It is achievable only through genuinely ethical action on the part of individuals, requiring a movement from the in-itself toward the for-itself. Against this backdrop, this article, primarily theoretical in nature and grounded in the dialectical method, examines the thought of György Lukács, focusing on the authentic objectification of ethical action. Particular attention is given to its historical character and social grounding, as well as to its orientation toward the for-itself. The main theoretical reference is Lukács’ Ontology of social being, where the main outlines of his ethical thought are developed. The discussion highlights a central claim in Lukács’ ethics: the need for the subject to move beyond the in-itself, understood as the sphere of particularity, and to attain the for-itself, that is, a level beyond mere particularity. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the dialectical relation between an ethics of intention and an ethics of consequences. It argues that practical deliberation must be guided by an intention directed, as far as possible, toward adequate outcomes. This responsibility extends beyond the individual and is realized within the social sphere. Ethical action must therefore take both the individual and society into account, without reducing one to the other, making possible a convergence between self and alterity and opening the path from the in-itself to the for-itself.