Promessas como razões protegidas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i2.95925Keywords:
Promessas. Razões protegidas. Garantia.Abstract
Joseph Raz nunca apresentou um argumento convincente para sustentar a tese de que promessas devem ser interpretadas como razões protegidas. Contudo, em um trabalho mais recente, ele estabeleceu a base necessária para esse argumento ao afirmar que a finalidade de prometer é oferecer ao promissário uma garantia normativa de que o ato prometido será praticado. Neste artigo, demonstro como uma concepção de promessas baseada no valor da garantia nos permite compreender o papel distintivo das razões para cumprir promessas como obrigações no raciocínio prático. Esse papel distintivo é precisamente o de uma razão de primeira ordem protegida por uma razão excludente. Ao analisar a função das promessas como fornecedoras de garantia normativa, podemos também enfrentar e resolver objeções conhecidas à consistência da própria noção de razão protegida.
References
ALEXANDER, L. Law and exclusionary reasons. Philosophical Topics, v. 18, n. 1, p. 5-22, 1990.
ARDAL, P. S. And that’s a promise. The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 18, n. 72, p. 225-237, 1968.
CHANG, R. Do we have normative powers? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, v. 94, n. 1, p. 275-300, 2020.
CLARKE, D. S. Exclusionary reasons. Mind, v. LXXXVI, n. 342, p. 252–255, 1977.
DARWALL, S. Demystifying promises. In: SHEINMAN, H. Promises and agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 255-276.
ESSERT, C. A dilemma for protected reasons. Law and Philosophy, v. 31, n. 1, p. 49-75, 2012.
GANS, C. Mandatory rules and exclusionary reasons. Philosophia, v. 15, n. 4, p. 373-394, 1986.
GILBERT, M. Scanlon on promissory obligation: the problem of Promisees’ Rights. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 101, n. 2, p. 83-109, 2004.
GILBERT, M. Three dogmas about promising. In: SHEINMAN, H. Promises and agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 80-108.
HOOKER, B. Promises and rule-consequentialism. In: SHEINMAN, H. Promises and agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 237-254.
HURD, H. M. Moral combat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
KOLODNY, N.; WALLACE, R. J. Promises and practices revisited. Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 31, n. 2, p. 119-154, 2003.
MACCORMICK, N. Voluntary obligations and normative powers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, v. 46, p. 59-78, 1972.
MARTIN, M. Judging positivism. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014.
MASON, E. We make no promises. Philosophical Studies, v. 123, n. 1-2, p. 33-46, 2005.
MCNEILLY, F. S. Promises de-moralized. The Philosophical Review, v. 81, n. 1, p. 63-81, 1972.
MIAN, E. The curious case of exclusionary reasons. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, v. 15, n. 1, p. 99-124, 2002.
MOLINA, C. Is there value in keeping a promise? A response to Joseph Raz. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, v. 15, n. 1, p. 85-90, 2019.
MOORE, M. S. Authority, law, and Razian Reasons. Southern California Law Review, v. 62, p. 827-896, 1989.
NARVESON, J. Promising, expecting, and utility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 1, n. 2, p. 207-233, 1971.
OWENS, D. A simple theory of promising. The Philosophical Review, v. 115, n. 1, p. 51-77, 2006.
OWENS, D. Rationalism about obligation. European Journal of Philosophy, v. 16, n. 3, p. 403-431, 2008.
OWENS, D. The problem with promising. In: SHEINMAN, H. Promises and agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 58-79.
PASSI, L. Promising by normative assurance. The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 73, n. 4, p. 1004-1023, 2023.
PERRY, S. R. Second-order reasons, uncertainty and legal theory. Southern California Law Review, v. 62, p. 913-994, 1989.
PILLER, C. Kinds of practical reasons: attitude-related reasons and exclusionary reasons. In: MIGUENS, S.; PINTO, J. A.; MAURO, C. E. Analyses. Porto: Porto University, 2006. p. 98-105.
PRATT, M. Promises and perlocutions. In: MATRAVERS, M. Scanlon and Contractualism. London: Frank Cass, 2003. p. 79-102.
RAWLS, J. Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review, v. 64, n. 1, p. 3-32, 1955.
RAZ, J. Exclusionary reasons. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021. Disponível em: https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3933033. Acesso em: 24 fev. 2022.
RAZ, J. Is there a reason to keep a promise? In: KLASS, G.; LETSAS, G.; SAPRAI, P. Philosophical foundations of contract law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 58-77.
RAZ, J. Practical reason and norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
RAZ, J. Promises and obligations. In: HACKER, P. M. S.; RAZ, J. Law, morality, and society: essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. p. 210-228.
RAZ, J. Promises in morality and law. Harvard Law Review, v. 95, p. 916-938, 1982.
RAZ, J. The authority of law: essays on law and morality. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
REGAN, D. H. Law’s halo. Social Philosophy and Policy, v. 4, n. 1, p. 15-30, 1986.
REGAN, D. H. Reasons, authority, and the meaning of “obey”: further thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, v. 3, p. 3-28, 1990.
SCANLON, T. M. Being realistic about reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
SCANLON, T. M. Promises and practices. Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 19, n. 3, p. 199-226, 1990.
SCANLON, T. M. Reasons, responsibility, and reliance: replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh. Ethics, v. 112, n. 3, p. 507-528, 2002.
SCANLON, T. M. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
SEARLE, J. R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
SHERWIN, E. The rationality of promising. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, v. 27, n. 3, p. 533-551, 2018.
SHIFFRIN, S. V. Promising, intimate relationships, and conventionalism. The Philosophical Review, v. 117, n. 4, p. 481-524, 2008.
SIDGWICK, H. The methods of ethics. 7. ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1962.
SINGER, P. Is act-utilitarianism self-defeating? The Philosophical Review, v. 81, n. 1, p. 94-104, 1972.
TOGNAZZINI, N. The hybrid nature of promissory obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 35, n. 3, p. 94-104, 2007.
WATSON, G. Promises, reasons, and normative powers. In: SOBEL, D.; WALL, S. Reasons for action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 155-178.
WHITING, D. Against second-order reasons. Noûs, v. 51, n. 2, p. 398–420, 2017.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Argumentos magazine is licensed under an International Creative Commons Attribution License.
The Magazine uses CC BY inclusion
1) The authors retain the copyright granted to the magazine or the right to initial publication, with the work regularly licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution, which allows the sharing of the work with acknowledgment of authorship and initial publication in this magazine.
2) The authors are authorized to contract additional applicable contracts, for non-exclusive distribution of the version of the work published in this journal (for example, publication in the institutional repository or as a chapter of the book), recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal.
3) Authors are authorized and encourage to publish and distribute their work online (for example, in institutional repositories or on their personal pages) at any time before or during the editorial process, as they can generate productive changes, as well as increase the impact and reference of published work.
How to Cite
Funding data
-
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Grant numbers 301418/2022-5
.jpg)
._._3.png)
1.jpg)
._._._.png)
