Promises as protected reasons

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i2.95925

Palavras-chave:

Promises. Protected reasons. Assurance.

Resumo

Joseph Raz has never provided a convincing argument to support the claim that promises should be interpreted as protected reasons. However, in a late work, he established the necessary foundation for this argument by asserting that the point of promising is to offer the promisee normative assurance that the promised act will be performed. In this paper, I demonstrate how an account of promises based on the value of assurance enables us to understand the distinctive role of reasons for keeping promises as obligations in practical reasoning. This distinctive role is precisely that of a first-order reason protected by an exclusionary reason. By analyzing the function of promises as providing normative assurance, we can also address and resolve well-known objections to the consistency of the very notion of a protected reason.

Biografia do Autor

  • Andrea Faggion, Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)

    Possui graduação em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Londrina (2000), mestrado (2003), doutorado (2007) e pós-doutorado (2011) em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Também realizou estágio como pesquisadora visitante (pós-doutorado) no Departamento de Filosofia da University of Colorado, em Boulder (USA) (2011). Atualmente, é professora associada do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Estadual de Londrina, onde coordenou a Especialização em Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea: Aspectos Éticos e Políticos, foi vice-coordenadora do Programa de Mestrado em Filosofia e é vice-chefe do Departamento de Filosofia. É membro permanente do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia stricto sensu da mesma universidade. É bolsista de Produtividade CNPq.

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Publicado

2026-03-02

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v. 17 n. 2

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Varia

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Como Citar

Faggion, A. (2026). Promises as protected reasons. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 17(2), 266-281. https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i2.95925

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