Promessas como razões protegidas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i2.95925Palabras clave:
Promessas. Razões protegidas. Garantia.Resumen
Joseph Raz nunca apresentou um argumento convincente para sustentar a tese de que promessas devem ser interpretadas como razões protegidas. Contudo, em um trabalho mais recente, ele estabeleceu a base necessária para esse argumento ao afirmar que a finalidade de prometer é oferecer ao promissário uma garantia normativa de que o ato prometido será praticado. Neste artigo, demonstro como uma concepção de promessas baseada no valor da garantia nos permite compreender o papel distintivo das razões para cumprir promessas como obrigações no raciocínio prático. Esse papel distintivo é precisamente o de uma razão de primeira ordem protegida por uma razão excludente. Ao analisar a função das promessas como fornecedoras de garantia normativa, podemos também enfrentar e resolver objeções conhecidas à consistência da própria noção de razão protegida.
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