Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle

Authors

  • Juliana Aggio

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i2.18925

Keywords:

Knowledge. Perception. Sensible object. Soul and body.

Abstract

This paper intends to clarify how perception knows the being according to Aristotle by treating a very controversial point: how perception discriminates its own objects and if this discrimination is strictly a physiological process or it is also an activity of the soul, and if it is also an activity of the soul, in which way the body’s physical alteration conjoined with a certain activity of the soul constitute perception.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Juliana Aggio

Doutoranda em Filosofia USP/Fapesp.

Published

2009-07-01

How to Cite

Aggio, J. (2009). Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i2.18925

Issue

Section

Artigos

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.