STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN OF LISTED COMPANIES IN BRAZIL

Authors

  • Paulo Vitor Souza de Souza Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)
  • Andréa Paula Osório Duque Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)
  • Dércio Santiago da Silva Junior Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.19094/contextus.v14i1.795

Keywords:

Compensation plan. Incentive hypothesis. Agency theory. Agency conflict of interest alignment.

Abstract

This study aims to show the structure of the compensation plan of Brazilian companies, identifying whether the incentives offered to managers help to minimize the agency conflict between the parties. A well-structured compensation plan assists in the alignment of interests between principal and agent. The study is characterized as descriptive, documentary and qualitative. The forms of reference of 291 publicly traded companies that provided information regarding executive compensation were analyzed in the years 2011 to 2013. More than half of companies adopt only short-term pay and few companies provide postemployment compensation to its executives. These factors contribute to the executives maximize their own interests, damaging the interests of the principal in the long run. We conclude that the remuneration plans of public companies in Brazil facilitate the manipulation of information, taking into account many short-term remuneration and remuneration based on accounting numbers.

Author Biographies

Paulo Vitor Souza de Souza, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)

Mestrando do Programa de Pós Graduação em Ciências Contábeis da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ).

Andréa Paula Osório Duque, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)

Doutora pela Universidade FederalFluminense (UFF); Professora Visitante do PPGCC da Universidade do Estado do Riode Janeiro (UERJ).

Dércio Santiago da Silva Junior, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)

Doutor pela Universidade do Estado doRio de Janeiro (UERJ); Professor Adjuntodo PPGCC da Universidade do Estado doRio de Janeiro (UERJ).

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Published

2016-06-23

How to Cite

Souza, P. V. S. de, Duque, A. P. O., & Silva Junior, D. S. da. (2016). STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN OF LISTED COMPANIES IN BRAZIL. Contextus - Contemporary Journal of Economics and Management, 14(1), 135–162. https://doi.org/10.19094/contextus.v14i1.795

Issue

Vol. 14 No. 1: jan/abr 2016

Section

Articles

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